基于財政補貼的民辦養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供給博弈分析

摘要： 隨著我國老齡化進程的加快,財政支持下的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)有效供給是政府和學(xué)者重點關(guān)注的問題?？紤]到政府補貼與養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)的利益關(guān)系,建立基于養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量和政府補貼分析的三階段博弈模型:第一階段為政府確定單位養(yǎng)老服務(wù)的補貼系數(shù)及補貼力度,第二階段為養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)確定服務(wù)質(zhì)量水平,第三階段為養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)確定服務(wù)價格,并對均衡結(jié)果進行實例分析。實例結(jié)果表明:老年人服務(wù)質(zhì)量偏好支付系數(shù)越高,高質(zhì)量養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供給量增加,社會總福利水平和養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)收益增加,養(yǎng)老服務(wù)財政補貼調(diào)整因子降低,而財政補貼力度增加;財政補貼質(zhì)量下限提高時,養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)收益和服務(wù)價格降低,財政補貼力度降低,高質(zhì)量養(yǎng)老機構(gòu)收益先增加后減小。實例分析在不降低養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量情況下,提高養(yǎng)老服務(wù)的經(jīng)濟效益與社會效益,所得結(jié)論為政府制定財政補貼機制和養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供給管理決策提供有效的參考及應(yīng)用依據(jù)。
Considering the interests of the government and the pension service agencies, we establish a three-stage game model based on the analysis of pension service quality and government subsidy: in the first stage the government determines unit endowment services subsidies degree; in the second stage pension service agencies determine the service quality; in the third stage pension service agencies determine the price of services for pension institutions. An example is given to analyze the equilibrium results.The results show that(1) the higher the elderly pay service quality preference coefficient, the higher the social total welfare and the higher the returns of the two institutions, mainwhile, the adjustment factor of pension service fiscal subsidies decreases, but the fiscal subsidies increase;(2) when the lower limit of fiscal subsidies is raised, the returns of the two institutions decrease, the returns of the institution with higher service quality increases at first and then decreases,the fiscal subsidy increases. The example results not only have reference value for the government to establish the fiscal subsidies mechanism of pension service and also provide insights into the decision-making for pension institutions.